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Abstract
The separation theorem in discrete convex analysis states that two disjoint discrete
convex sets can be separated by a hyperplane with a 0-1 normal vector. We apply this
theorem to an auction model and provide a unified approach to existing results. When
p is not an equilibrium price vector, i.e., aggregate demand and aggregate supply are
disjoint, the separation theorem indicates the existence of excess demand/supply. This
observation yields a refined analysis of a characterization of competitive price vectors
by Gul and Stacchetti (2000). Adjusting the prices of items in excess demand/supply
corresponds to Ausubel’s (2006) auction.
JEL classification: C78, D44
1 Introduction
The purpose of the present paper is to apply the separation theorem in discrete convex
analysis (Murota 2003) to an auction model and provide a unified approach to existing
results. The discrete separation theorem states that two disjoint discrete convex sets can
be separated by a hyperplane with a 0-1 normal vector. As recognized in the literature,
under the gross-substitutes condition, aggregate demand forms a discrete convex set called
the M\-convex set. Geometrically, Walrasian equilibrium can be described as a situation
where aggregate demand and aggregate supply intersect. To put it differently, p is not an
equilibrium price vector if and only if aggregate demand and aggregate supply are disjoint.
Applying the discrete separation theorem to the two sets, the “slope” of the separating
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hyperplane turns out to describe excess demand or excess supply. This observation yileds a
refined analysis of Hall’s (1935) theorem and a characterization of competitive price vectors
by Gul and Stacchetti (2000). We further show that Ausubel’s (2006) auction proceeds
by increasing/decreasing the prices of items in excess demand/supply, thereby providing an
economic interpretation of the auction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents preliminaries. Section
3 presents an application of the discrete separation theorem to an auction model. Section 4
presents concluding remarks. Section 5 presents proofs of the main results.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Discrete convex analysis
Let Z be the set of integers and K be an arbitrary finite set. For x ∈ ZK , we define
supp+x = {k ∈ K : xk > 0}, supp−x = {k ∈ K : xk < 0}.
For each A ⊆ K, let χA ∈ {0, 1}K denote the characteristic vector of A, i.e.,
(χA)k =
1 if k ∈ A,0 otherwise.
For a singleton set {k} ⊆ K, we write χk for χ{k}.
We say that a function v : {0, 1}K → R is an M\-concave function if, for any x, y ∈
{0, 1}K and k ∈ supp+(x− y), we have
(i) v(x) + v(y) ≤ v(x− χk) + v(y + χk), or
(ii) there exists ` ∈ supp−(x− y) such that v(x) + v(y) ≤ v(x− χk + χ`) + v(y+ χk − χ`).
Section 3 of Kojima et al. (2017) provides an interpretation for M\-concavity.
We say that X ⊆ ZK with X 6= ∅ is an M\-convex set if, for any x, y ∈ X and
k ∈ supp+(x− y), we have
(i) x− χk ∈ X, y + χk ∈ X, or
(ii) there exists ` ∈ supp−(x− y) such that x− χk + χ` ∈ X, y + χk − χ` ∈ X.
The following is a discrete analogue of the separation theorem.
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Theorem 1. Let X1, X2 ⊆ ZK be M\-convex sets. If X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, there exists α ∈
{0, 1}K ∪ {0,−1}K such that
sup
x∈X1
α · x < inf
x∈X2
α · x.
Proof. See Section 5.1.
As is the case for continuous settings, this theorem states that two “convex” sets can be
separated by a hyperplane. The key difference is that the normal vector α can be taken as
a characteristic vector (i.e., a vector with 0-1 coordinates).
The following figure shows an example of the discrete separation theorem for K = {k, `}.
Note that each “edge” of X1 and X2 is parallel to χk − χ` or χk or χ`.1 The normal vector
of the separating hyperplane is taken as α = (1, 1).
Figure 1: Discrete separation theorem for K = {k, `}
Remark 1. The separation theorem in discrete settings is already proved for two sets sat-
isfying M-convexity, which is stronger than (but essentially equivalent to) M\-convexity (see
Murota 2003, Theorem 4.21). We provide another proof for its fundamental importance.
For two sets X1, X2 ⊆ ZK , we define the Minkowski sum X1 +X2 by
X1 +X2 = {x1 + x2 : x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2}.
The following theorem says that M\-convexity is preserved in Minkowski sum.
1An M\-convex set in a general n-dimensional space can be characterized in terms of the direction of
edges; see Murota (2003), p.119.
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Theorem 2 (Murota 2003, Theorem 4.23). Let X1, X2 ⊆ ZK be M\-convex sets. Then,
X1 +X2 is an M
\-convex set.
3 Application to an auction model
We show that the discrete separation theorem clarifies the mathematical structure behind
an auction model.
Let N be a finite set of agents and K be a finite set of items. Each agent i has a
valuation function vi : {0, 1}K → Z; we identify a subset of items A ⊆ K with χA. For
each i ∈ N , we define the demand correspondence Di : RK+ → {0, 1}K by
Di(p) =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}K : vi[p](x) ≥ vi[p](y) for all y ∈ {0, 1}K
}
for all p ∈ RK+ ,
where vi[p](x) = vi(x)− p · x.
We say that vi is monotonic if for any A,B ⊆ K with A ⊆ B, we have vi(χA) ≤ vi(χB).
We say that vi satisfies the gross substitutes condition (Kelso and Crawford 1982) if for
any p, q ∈ RK+ with p ≤ q and x ∈ Di(p), there exists y ∈ Di(q) such that xk ≤ yk if pk = qk.
Theorem 3 (Fujishige and Yang 2003). Suppose vi is monotonic. Then vi satisfies the gross
substitutes condition if and only if vi is M
\-concave.
Throughout this paper, we assume that vi is monotonic and satisfies the gross substitutes
condition for all i ∈ N . By Theorem 3, vi is M\-concave for all i ∈ N .
Theorem 4 (Fujishige and Yang 2003; Murota 2003, Theorem 6.30). Let vi be an M
\-concave
function. Then, for any p ∈ RK+ , Di(p) is an M\-convex set.
An allocation is a set of bundles (xi)i∈N satisfying
xi ∈ {0, 1}K for all i ∈ N,
∑
i∈N
xi = χK .
A Walrasian equilibrium is a pair
(
p∗, (x∗i )i∈N
)
, where p∗ ∈ RK+ , x∗ is an allocation,
and x∗i ∈ Di(p∗) for all i ∈ N . We say that p∗ is a (Walrasian) equilibrium price vector
if there exists an allocation (x∗i )i∈N such that
(
p∗, (x∗i )i∈N
)
is a Walrasian equilibrium.
For each p ∈ RK+ , we define the aggregate demand D(p) by
D(p) =
∑
i∈N
Di(p).
The following lemma immediately follows from the definition of an equilibrium price vector.
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Lemma 1. A price vector p ∈ RK+ is an equilibrium price vector if and only if χK ∈ D(p).
Equivalently, p is not an equilibrium price vector if and only if
χK /∈ D(p). (1)
By Theorems 2-4, D(p) is an M\-convex set. Regarding χK as a singleton set, {χK} is an
M\-convex set. Hence (1) refers to two disjoint M\-convex sets. By Theorem 1, there exists
α ∈ {0, 1}K ∪ {0,−1}K such that
α · χK < min
x∈D(p)
α · x. (2)
Assume α ∈ {0, 1}K and let A ⊆ K be such that α = χA. Then (2) is equivalent to
|A| < min
x∈∑i∈N Di(p)
∑
k∈A
xk
=
∑
i∈N
min
xi∈Di(p)
∑
k∈A
(xi)k
=
∑
i∈N
min
xi∈Di(p)
∣∣{k ∈ A : (xi)k = 1}∣∣. (3)
For each i ∈ N , Gul and Stacchetti (2000) called the above minimum value the requirement
function and interpreted it as follows: “the minimal number of objects in A that she would
need to construct any of her optimal consumption bundles”. In the above inequality, the
sum of the minimal numbers among agents is greater than the number of items in A, which
means excess demand.
When α ∈ {0,−1}K , letting A ⊆ K be such that α = −χA, (2) is equivalent to
|A| >
∑
i∈N
max
xi∈Di(p)
∣∣{k ∈ A : (xi)k = 1}∣∣,
which means excess supply.
For p ∈ RK+ and A ⊆ K, we define
Rmini (p,A) = min
xi∈Di(p)
∣∣{k ∈ A : (xi)k = 1}∣∣, Rmin(p,A) = ∑
i∈N
Rmini (A, p),
Rmaxi (p,A) = max
xi∈Di(p)
∣∣{k ∈ A : (xi)k = 1}∣∣, Rmax(p,A) = ∑
i∈N
Rmini (A, p).
We summarize the above discussion as a theorem.2
2The above discussion proves the contrapositive of the if part of Theorem 5. The only if part immediately
follows from the definition of a competitive price vector.
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Theorem 5. p ∈ RK+ is an equilibrium price vector if and only if
Rmin(p,A) ≤ |A| ≤ Rmax(p,A) for all A ⊆ K.
This theorem has an intuitive interpretation that p is an equilibrium price vector if and
only if excess demand/supply do not exist.
The above argument enables a refined analysis of a characterization of competitive price
vectors by Gul and Stacchetti (2000). Indeed, their characterization immediately follows
from the discrete separation theorem. Let [0, χK ] denote the integer interval between 0
and χK , i.e., [0, χK ] = {x ∈ ZK : 0 ≤ x ≤ χK}. We say that p is a quasi competitive
price vector if [0, χK ] ∩D(p) 6= ∅. Namely, p is a quasi competitive price vector if all the
items are consumed by at most one agent.
Corollary 1 (Gul and Stacchetti 2000, Corollary). p is a quasi competitive price vector if
and only if
Rmin(p,A) ≤ |A| for all A ⊆ K.
Proof. The only if part immediately follows from the definition of a quasi competitive price
vector. We prove the contrapositive of the if part. If p is not a quasi competitive price
vector, then [0, χk] ∩D(p) = ∅. Since any integer interval is an M\-convex set, by Theorem
1, there exists α ∈ {0, 1} ∪ {0,−1} such that
max
x∈[0,χK ]
α · x < min
x∈D(p)
α · x. (4)
If α ∈ {0,−1}, then we derive max
x∈[0,χK ]
α · x = 0 ≥ min
x∈D(p)
α · x, a contradiction to (4). Hence,
α ∈ {0, 1}. Since max
x∈[0,χK ]
α · x = α · χK , by choosing A ⊆ K with α = χA, the same
transformation as (3) yields the desired condition.
Remark 2. Hall’s (1935) theorem is a fundamental theorem in graph theory. See Demange
et al. (1986) as well as Section 8.3 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for its application to
auctions. As discussed by Gul and Stacchetti (2000), Corollary 1 is a generalization of Hall’s
(1935) theorem. Hence, Hall’s (1935) theorem can be obtained by the discrete separation
theorem.
Based on the description of excess demand and supply in Theorem 5, we provide an
economic interpretation of Ausubel’s (2006) auction. For each i ∈ N , we define the indirect
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utility function Vi : RK+ → Z by
Vi(p) = max
x∈{0,1}K
vi[p](x) for all p ∈ RK+
We define the Lyapunov function (Ausubel 2006) L : ZK+ → Z by
L(p) =
∑
i∈N
Vi(p) + p · χK for all p ∈ ZK+ .
Ausubel’s (2006) auction proceeds by decreasing the value of the Lyapunov function. The
next theorem shows that the auction proceeds by increasing (res. decreasing) the prices of
items in excess demand (res. excess supply).
Theorem 6. Let p ∈ ZK+ and A ⊆ K. Then,
(i) L(p+ χA) < L(p) if and only if |A| < Rmin(A, p).
(ii) L(p− χA) < L(p) if and only if |A| > Rmax(A, p).
Proof. See Section 5.2.
Remark 3. The Lyapunov function L(·) satisfies a notion of discrete concavity called L\-
concavity (see Section 8 of Murota (2016) for a detailed discussion), where L refers to lattice.
Combining L\-concavity with Theorems 5 and 6, we can prove that p is a competitive price
vector if and only if p is a minimizer of L(·), which was previously proved by Ausubel (2006).
L\-concavity also implies that the set of competitive price vectors has a lattice structure.
4 Concluding remarks
As proven by Murota et al. (2016), many existing iterative auctions can be embedded
into Ausubel’s (2006) auction. Hence our result shows that the discrete separation theorem
is a critical mathematical tool in iterative auctions.
There are many papers that provide a characterization of the Walrasian equilibria; see,
for example, Mishra and Talman (2010). It remains as a topic for future work to apply
the discrtete separation theorem to other characterizations and clarify the mathematical
structure behind them.
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5 Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For x ∈ ZK and X ⊆ ZK , we define
d+(x,X) = {k ∈ K : x+ χk ∈ X}, d−(x,X) = {k ∈ K : x− χk ∈ X}.
For x ∈ ZK and A ⊆ K, we define3
||x||1 =
∑
k∈K
|xk|, x(A) =
∑
k∈A
xk.
Lemma 2 (Murota Shioura 1999, Lemma 4.3). Let X ⊆ ZK be an M\-convex set. Then,
for any x, y ∈ X with x(K) < y(K), there exists k ∈ supp+(y − x) such that
x+ χk ∈ X and y − χk ∈ X.
Claim 1. Let X ⊆ ZK be an M\-convex set and x /∈ X. If d+(x,X) 6= ∅, then
x(d+(x,X)) < y(d+(x,X)) for all y ∈ X.
Proof. We proceed by induction on ||x− y||1 for y ∈ X.
Induction base: Case 1: Suppose ||x− y||1 = 1. We consider two subcases.
Subcase 1-1: Suppose y = x + χk for some k ∈ K. Since y = x + χk ∈ X, we have
k ∈ d+(x,X). Then,
x(d+(x,X)) < (x+ χk)(d
+(x,X)) = y(d+(x,X)).
Subcase 1-2: Suppose y = x− χ` for some ` ∈ K. Let k ∈ d+(x,X). We apply Lemma 2
to x + χk, y ∈ X with (x + χk)(K) > y(K). Since supp+((x + χk) − y) = {k, `}, we have
(x+ χk)− χk = x ∈ X or y + χ` = x ∈ X, either of which is a contradiction to x /∈ X.
Case 2: Suppose ||x− y||1 = 2. Let k ∈ d+(x,X). We consider three subcases.
Subcase 2-1: Suppose y = x+ 2 · χ` for some ` ∈ K. We apply Lemma 2 to y, x+ χk ∈ X
with y(K) > (x+ χk)(K). Since supp
+(y − (x+ χk)) = {`}, we have y − χ` = x+ χ` ∈ X.
Hence ` ∈ d+(x,X), which implies
x(d+(x,X)) < (x+ 2 · χ`)(d+(x,X)) = y(d+(x,X)).
3||x||1 is called the `1-norm of x.
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Subcase 2-2: Suppose y = x + χ` − χm for some `,m ∈ K with ` 6= m. We apply Lemma
2 to x + χk, y ∈ X with (x + χk)(K) > y(K). Note that supp+((x + χk) − y) = {k,m} if
k 6= ` and supp+((x+ χk)− y) = {m} if k = `. Since (x+ χk)− χk = x /∈ X, in eihter case,
we have y + χm = x+ χ` ∈ X. Namely, ` ∈ d+(x,X).
Suppose m ∈ d+(x,X). We apply Lemma 2 to x+χm, y ∈ X with (x+χm)(K) > y(K).
Since supp+((x + χm) − y) = {m}, we have (x + χm) − χm = x ∈ X, a contradiction to
x /∈ X. Hence, m /∈ d+(x,X).
By ` ∈ d+(x,X) and m /∈ d+(x,X),
x(d+(x,X)) < (x+ χ` − χm)(d+(x,X)) = y(d+(x,X)).
Subcase 2-3: Suppose y = x−2·χ` for some ` ∈ K. We apply Lemma 2 to x+χk, y ∈ X with
(x+χk)(K) > y(K). Note that supp
+((x+χk)− y) = {k, `}. Since (x+χk)−χk = x /∈ X,
we have (y + χ`) = x − χ` ∈ X. Following the same argument as Subcase 1-2, we obtain a
contradiction to x /∈ X.
Induction step: Let t ≥ 3. Suppose the result holds for all y ∈ X with 1 ≤ ||x−y||1 ≤ t−1.
We prove the result for y ∈ X with ||x− y||1 = t.
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists y ∈ X such that ||x− y||1 = t and
x(d+(x,X)) ≥ y(d+(x,X)). (5)
Let k ∈ d+(x,X) be such that xk − yk ≥ xk′ − yk′ for all k′ ∈ d+(x,X). By (5), xk − yk ≥ 0.
By M\-convexity applied to x+ χk, y ∈ X and k ∈ supp+((x+ χk)− y), we have
(i) x ∈ X and y + χk ∈ X, or
(ii) there exists ` ∈ supp−((x+ χk)− y) such that x+ χ` ∈ X and y + χk − χ` ∈ X.
By x /∈ X, (ii) holds. By x+ χ` ∈ X, we have ` ∈ d+(x,X). Together with (5),
x(d+(x,X)) ≥ y(d+(x,X)) = (y + χk − χ`)(d+(x,X)). (6)
By (ii), y + χk − χ` ∈ X. Since ` ∈ d+(x,X) and y` > x` + (χk)` = x`, together with the
choice of k and (5), we obtain xk−yk > 0. Hence, ||x−(y+χk−χ`)||1 = ||x−y||1−2 = t−2.
Then, (6) contradicts the induction hypothesis.
Claim 2. Let X ⊆ ZK be an M\-convex set and x /∈ X. If d−(x,X) 6= ∅, then
x(d−(x,X)) > y(d−(x,X)) for all y ∈ X.
Proof. This claim can be proved in the same way as Claim 1
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Claim 3. Let X ⊆ ZK be an M\-convex set and x /∈ X. Then, there exists α ∈ {0, 1}K ∪
{0,−1}K such that
α · x < inf
y∈X
α · y. (7)
Proof. Let y¯ ∈ X be such that ||x − y¯||1 ≤ ||x − y||1 for all y ∈ X. Set m = ||x − y¯||1 and
let k ∈ supp+(y¯ − x) ∪ supp−(y¯ − x) 6= ∅.
Case 1: Suppose k ∈ supp+(y¯−x). By the choice of y¯, we have y¯−χk /∈ X. Set x¯ = y¯−χk.
By d+(x¯, X) 6= ∅, Claim 1 implies
x¯(d+(x¯, X)) < y(d+(y,X)) for all y ∈ X. (8)
Suppose by way of contradiction that x(d+(x¯, X)) > x¯(d+(x¯, X)). Then there exists
` ∈ d+(x¯, X) with x` > x¯` = y¯` − (χk)`. Together with y¯k > xk, we have k 6= `, from which
follows x` > y¯`. By x¯+ χ` = y¯ − χk + χ` ∈ X and ||(y¯ − χk + χ`)− x||1 = m− 2, we obtain
a contradiction to the choice of y¯.
It follows that x(d+(x¯, X)) ≤ x¯(d+(x¯, X)). Together with (8),
x(d+(x¯, X)) < y(d+(y,X)) for all y ∈ X.
Set A = d+(x¯, X). By the above inequality, together with the fact that y(d+(y,X)) always
takes an integer value, we obtain (7) for α = χA.
Case 2: Suppose k ∈ supp−(y¯ − x). This case can be proved in the same way as Case 1.
Applying Claim 2 instead of Claim 1, we obtain α ∈ {0,−1}K that satisfies (7).
For X ⊆ ZK , we define −X = {x ∈ ZK : −x ∈ X}.
Claim 4. Let X ⊆ ZK be an M\-convex set. Then, −X is also an M\-convex set.
Proof. This claim immediately follows from the definition of M\-convexity.
Proof of Theorem 1 . By Theorem 2 and Claim 4, −X1 + X2 is an M\-convex set. By
X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, 0 /∈ −X1 + X2. Applying Claim 3, there exists α ∈ {0, 1}K ∪ {0,−1}K such
that
0 < inf
x∈−X1+X2
α · x,
0 < inf
x1∈X1
α · (−x1) + inf
x2∈X2
α · x2,
0 < − sup
x1∈X1
α · x1 + inf
x2∈X2
α · x2,
sup
x1∈X1
α · x1 < inf
x2∈X2
α · x2,
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which completes the proof.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 6
Let A ⊆ K and p ∈ ZK+ . We prove (i) and omit the proof of (ii) which can be obtained
analogously.
Only-if: We prove the contrapositive. Suppose there exist xi ∈ Di(p) for i ∈ N such that
|A| ≥ χA ·
∑
i∈N
xi. (9)
Then,
L(p) =
∑
i∈N
Vi(p) + p · χK
=
∑
i∈N
{vi(xi)− p · xi}+ p · χK
≤
∑
i∈N
vi(xi)− p ·
∑
i∈N
xi + p · χK + |A| − χA ·
∑
i∈N
xi
=
∑
i∈N
vi(xi)− (p+ χA) ·
∑
i∈N
xi + (p+ χA) · χK
=
∑
i∈N
{vi(xi)− (p+ χA) · xi
}
+ (p+ χA) · χK
≤
∑
i∈N
Vi(p+ χA) + (p+ χA) · χK
= L(p+ χA).
where the first inequality follows from (9) and the second inequality follows from the definifion
of the indirect utility function.
If:
For i ∈ N and a ∈ Z+, we define
Dai (p) =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}K : vi[p](x) ≥ Vi(p)− a
}
.
Note that D0i (p) = Di(p).
Theorem 7 (Murota 2003, Theorem 6.15). Let p ∈ RK and vi be an M\-concave function.
Then, vi[p] is an M
\-concave function.
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Claim 5. Let i ∈ N . Then for any a ∈ Z+, we have
x ∈ Dai (p) implies x · χA ≥ Rmini (A, p)− a.
Proof. For each a ∈ Z+, set
Da = {x ∈ {0, 1}K : x ∈ Dai (p) and x · χA < Rmini (A, p)− a}.
It suffices to prove that Da = ∅ for all a ∈ Z+. We proceed by induction on a. If a = 0, the
result follows from Rmini (A, p) ≥ 0. Suppose that the result holds for a = k and we prove
the result for a = k + 1, where k ≥ 1.
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists x ∈ Dk+1. Let x¯ ∈ Di(p) be such that
|supp+(x¯− x) ∩ A| ≤ |supp+(y − x) ∩ A| for all y ∈ Di(p). By x¯ · χA ≥ Rmini (A, p), it holds
that x¯ · χA > x · χA. This means that there exists k ∈ supp+(x¯ − x) ∩ A. By Theorem 7,
vi[p] is an M
\-concave function. With the notation χ0 = 0, by M
\-concavity, there exists
` ∈ supp−(x¯− x) ∪ {0} such that
vi[p](x¯) + vi[p](x) ≤ vi[p](x¯− χk + χ`) + vi[p](x+ χk − χ`). (10)
Since (x + χk − χ`) · χA ≤ x · χA + 1 < Rmini (A, p) − k, by the induction hypothesis,
x + χk − χ` /∈ Dki (p). Together with x ∈ Dk+1i (p), we obtain vi[p](x) ≥ vi[p](x + χk − χ`).
This inequality and (10) imply vi[p](x¯) ≤ vi[p](x¯− χk + χ`). Namely,
x¯− χk + χ` ∈ Di(p) and |supp+((x¯− χk + χ`)− x) ∩ A| = |supp+(x¯− x) ∩ A| − 1,
a contradiction to the choice of x¯.
For any i ∈ N and xi ∈ {0, 1}K , by letting a(xi) := Vi(p)− vi[p](xi),
vi[p+ χA](xi) = vi[p](xi)− χA · xi
= Vi(p)− a(xi)− χA · xi
≤ Vi(p)− a(xi)−Rmini (A, p) + a(xi)
= Vi(p)−Rmini (A, p), (11)
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where the inequality follows from Claim 5. For each i ∈ N , let x¯i ∈ Di(p+ χA). Then,
L(p+ χA) =
∑
i∈N
Vi(p+ χA) + p · χK + |A|
=
∑
i∈N
vi[p+ χA](x¯i) + p · χK + |A|
≤
∑
i∈N
Vi(p)−
∑
i∈N
Rmini (A, p) + p · χK + |A|
<
∑
i∈N
Vi(p) + p · χK
= L(p),
where the first inequality follows from (11) and the second inequality follows from the as-
sumption.
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